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Abstract
Modern microarchitectures incorporate optimization tech-
niques such as speculative loads and store forwarding to
improve the memory bottleneck. The processor executes the
load speculatively before the stores, and forwards the data
of a preceding store to the load if there is a potential depen-
dency. This enhances performance since the load does not
have to wait for preceding stores to complete. However, the
dependency prediction relies on partial address information,
which may lead to false dependencies and stall hazards.
In this work, we are the first to show that the dependency
resolution logic that serves the speculative load can be ex-
ploited to gain information about the physical page mappings.
Microarchitectural side-channel attacks such as Rowhammer
and cache attacks like Prime+Probe rely on the reverse engi-
neering of the virtual-to-physical address mapping. We pro-
pose the SPOILER attack which exploits this leakage to speed
up this reverse engineering by a factor of 256. Then, we show
how this can improve the Prime+Probe attack by a 4096
factor speed up of the eviction set search, even from sand-
boxed environments like JavaScript. Finally, we improve the
Rowhammer attack by showing how SPOILER helps to con-
duct DRAM row conflicts deterministically with up to 100%
chance, and by demonstrating a double-sided Rowhammer
attack with normal user’s privilege. The later is due to the
possibility of detecting contiguous memory pages using the
SPOILER leakage.
1 Introduction
Microarchitectural attacks have evolved over the past decade
from attacks on weak cryptographic implementations [5] to
devastating attacks breaking through layers of defenses pro-
vided by the hardware and the Operating System (OS) [52].
These attacks can steal secrets such as cryptographic keys [4,
44] or keystrokes [33]. More advanced attacks can entirely
subvert the OS memory isolation to read the memory content
from more privileged security domains [35], and to bypass
defense mechanisms such as Kernel Address Space Layout
Randomization (KASLR) [11, 17]. Rowhammer attacks can
further break the data and code integrity by tampering with
memory contents [29,47]. While most of these attacks require
local access and native code execution, various efforts have
been successful in conducting them remotely [50] or from
within a remotely accessible sandbox such as JavaScript [42].
Memory components such as DRAM [29] and cache [43]
are not the only microarchitectural attack surfaces. Spectre
attacks on the branch prediction unit [30, 38] imply that side
channels such as caches can be used as a primitive for more
advanced attacks on speculative engines. Speculative engines
predict the outcome of an operation before its completion,
and they enable execution of the following dependent instruc-
tions ahead of time based on the prediction. As a result, the
pipeline can maximize the instruction level parallelism and re-
source usage. In rare cases where the prediction is wrong, the
pipeline needs to be flushed resulting in performance penal-
ties. However, this approach suffers from a security weakness,
in which an adversary can fool the predictor and introduce ar-
bitrary mispredictions that leave microarchitectural footprints
in the cache. These footprints can be collected through the
cache side channel to steal secrets.
Modern processors feature further speculative behavior
such as memory disambiguation and speculative loads [10]. A
load operation can be executed speculatively before preced-
ing store operations. During the speculative execution of the
load, false dependencies may occur due to the unavailability
of physical address information. These false dependencies
need to be resolved to avoid computation on invalid data. The
occurrence of false dependencies and their resolution depend
on the actual implementation of the memory subsystem. Intel
uses a proprietary memory disambiguation and dependency
resolution logic in the processors to predict and resolve false
dependencies that are related to the speculative load. In this
work, we discover that the dependency resolution logic suffers
from an unknown false dependency independent of the 4K
aliasing [40, 49]. The discovered false dependency happens
during the 1 MB aliasing of speculative memory accesses
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which is exploited to leak information about physical page
mappings.
The state-of-the-art microarchitectural attacks [25, 45] ei-
ther rely on knowledge of physical addresses or are signifi-
cantly eased by that knowledge. Yet, knowledge of the physi-
cal address space is only granted with root privileges. Cache
attacks such as Prime+Probe on the Last-Level Cache (LLC)
are challenging due to the unknown mapping of virtual ad-
dresses to cache sets and slices. Knowledge about the physical
page mappings enables more attack opportunities using the
Prime+Probe technique. Rowhammer [29] attacks require
efficient access to rows within the same bank to induce fast
row conflicts. To achieve this, an adversary needs to reverse
engineer layers of abstraction from the virtual address space
to DRAM cells. Availability of physical address information
facilitates this reverse engineering process. In sandboxed en-
vironments, attacks are more limited, since in addition to the
limited access to the address space, low-level instructions
are also inaccessible [18]. Previous attacks assume special
access privileges only granted through weak software config-
urations [25,34,55] to overcome some of these challenges. In
contrast, SPOILER only relies on simple operations, load and
store, to recover crucial physical address information, which
in turn enables Rowhammer and cache attacks, by leaking
information about physical pages without assuming any weak
configuration or special privileges.
1.1 Our Contribution
We have discovered a novel microarchitectural leakage which
reveals critical information about physical page mappings
to user space processes. The leakage can be exploited by a
limited set of instructions, which is visible in all Intel genera-
tions starting from the 1st generation of Intel Core processors,
independent of the OS and also works from within virtual ma-
chines and sandboxed environments. In summary, this work:
1. exposes a previously unknown microarchitectural leak-
age stemming from the false dependency hazards during
speculative load operations.
2. proposes an attack, SPOILER, to efficiently exploit this
leakage to speed up the reverse engineering of virtual-to-
physical mappings by a factor of 256 from both native
and JavaScript environments.
3. demonstrates a novel eviction set search technique from
JavaScript and compares its reliability and efficiency to
existing approaches.
4. achieves efficient DRAM row conflicts and the first
double-sided Rowhammer attack with normal user-level
privilege using the contiguous memory detection capa-
bility of SPOILER.
5. explores how SPOILER can track nearby load operations
from a more privileged security domain right after a
context switch.
1.2 Related Work
Kosher et al. [30] and Maisuradze et al. [38] have exploited
vulnerabilities in the speculative branch prediction unit. Tran-
sient execution of instructions after a fault, as exploited by
Lipp et al. [35] and Bulck et al. [52], can leak memory con-
tent of protected environments. Similarly, transient behavior
due to the lazy store/restore of the FPU and SIMD registers
can leak register contents from other contexts [48]. New vari-
ants of both Meltdown and Spectre have been systematically
analyzed [7]. The Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) vulnera-
bility [21] is a variant of the Spectre attack and relies on the
stale sensitive data in registers to be used as an address for
speculative loads which may then allow the attacker to read
this sensitive data. In contrast to previous attacks on specu-
lative and transient behaviors, we discover a new leakage on
the undocumented memory disambiguation and dependency
resolution logic. SPOILER is not a Spectre attack. The root
cause for SPOILER is a weakness in the address speculation of
Intel’s proprietary implementation of the memory subsystem
which directly leaks timing behavior due to physical address
conflicts. Existing spectre mitigations would therefore not
interfere with SPOILER.
The timing behavior of the 4K aliasing false dependency
on Intel processors have been studied [12, 61]. MemJam [40]
uses this behavior to perform a side-channel attack, and Sul-
livan et al. [49] demonstrate a covert channel. These works
only mention the 4K aliasing as documented by Intel [24],
and the authors conclude that the address aliasing check is a
two stage approach: Firstly, it uses page offset for the initial
guess. Secondly, it performs the final resolution based on the
exact physical address. On the contrary, we discover that the
undocumented address resolution logic performs additional
partial address checks that lead to an unknown, but observable
aliasing behavior based on the physical address.
Several microarchitectural attacks have been discovered to
recover virtual address information and break KASLR by ex-
ploiting the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) [22], Branch
Target Buffer (BTB) [11] and Transactional Synchronization
Extensions (TSX) [27]. Additionally, Gruss et al. [17] ex-
ploit the timing information obtained from the prefetch
instruction to leak the physical address information. The main
obstacle to this approach is that the prefetch instruction is
not accessible in JavaScript, and it can be disabled in native
sandboxed environments [62], whereas SPOILER is applicable
to sandboxed environments including JavaScript.
Knowledge of the physical address enables adversaries to
bypass OS protections [28] and ease other microarchitectural
attacks [34]. For instance, the procfs filesystem exposes
physical addresses [34], and Huge pages allocate contiguous
physical memory [25, 36]. Drammer [55] exploits the An-
droid ION memory allocator to access contiguous memory.
However, access to the aforementioned primitives is restricted
on most environments by default. We do not have any assump-
tion about the OS and software configuration, and we exploit
a hardware leakage with minimum access rights to find virtual
pages that have the same least significant 20 physical address
bits. GLitch [13] detects contiguous physical pages by ex-
ploiting row conflicts through the GPU interface. In contrast,
our attack does not rely on a specific integrated GPU configu-
ration, and it is widely applicable to any system running on
an Intel CPU. We use SPOILER to find contiguous physical
pages with a high probability and verify it by producing row
conflicts. SPOILER is particularly helpful for attacks in sand-
boxed low-privilege environments such as JavaScript, where
previous methods require a time-consuming brute forcing of
the memory addresses [18, 42, 47].
2 Background
2.1 Memory Management
The virtual memory manager shares the DRAM across all
running tasks by assigning isolated virtual address spaces to
each task. The assigned memory is allocated in pages, which
are typically 4 kB each, and each virtual page will be stored as
a physical page in DRAM through a virtual-to-physical page
mapping. Memory instructions operate on virtual addresses,
which are translated within the processor to the correspond-
ing physical addresses. The page offset comprising the least
significant 12 bits of the virtual address is not translated. The
processor only translates the bits in the rest of the virtual
address, the virtual page number. The OS is the reference for
this translation, and the processor stores the translation results
inside the TLB. As a result, repeated translations of the same
address are performed more efficiently.
2.2 Cache Hierarchy
Modern processors incorporate multiple levels of caches to
avoid the DRAM access latency. The cache memory on Intel
processors is organized into sets and slices. Each set can store
a certain number of lines, where the line size is 64 bytes. The
6 Least Significant Bits (LSBs) of the physical address are
used to determine the offset within a line and the remaining
bits are used to determine which set to store the cache line in.
The number of physical address bits that are used for mapping
is higher for the LLC, since it has a large number of sets, e.g.,
8192 sets. Hence, the untranslated part of the virtual address
bits which is the page offset, cannot be used to index the LLC
sets. Instead, higher physical address bits are used. Further,
each set of LLC is divided into multiple slices, one slice for
each logical processor. The mapping of the physical addresses
to the slices uses an undocumented function [26]. When the
processor accesses a memory address, a cache hit or miss
occurs. If a miss occurs in all cache levels, the memory line
has to be fetched from DRAM. Accesses to the same memory
address would be served from the cache unless other memory
accesses evict that cache line. In addition, we can use the
clflush instruction, which follows the same memory access
check as other memory operations, to evict our own cache
lines from the entire cache hierarchy.
2.3 Prime+Probe Attack
In the Prime+Probe attack, the attacker first fills an entire
cache set by accessing memory addresses that are mapped
to the same set, an eviction set. Later, the attacker checks
whether the victim program has displaced any entry in the
cache set by accessing the eviction set again and measuring
the execution time. If this is the case, the attacker can de-
tect congruent addresses, since the displaced entries cause an
increased access time. However, finding the eviction sets is
difficult due to the unknown translation of virtual addresses
to physical addresses. Since an unprivileged attacker has no
access to hugepages [23] or the virtual-to-physical page map-
ping such as the pagemap file [34], knowledge about the phys-
ical address bits greatly speeds up the eviction set search.
2.4 Rowhammer Attack
DRAM consists of multiple memory banks, and each bank is
subdivided into rows. When the processor accesses a memory
location, the corresponding row needs to be activated and
loaded into the row buffer. If the processor accesses the same
row again, it is called a row hit, and the request will be served
from the row buffer. Otherwise, it is called a row conflict, and
the previous row will be deactivated and copied back to the
original row location, after which the new row is activated.
DRAM cells leak charge over time and need to be refreshed
periodically to maintain the data. A Rowhammer [29] at-
tack causes cells of a victim row to leak faster by activating
the neighboring rows repeatedly. If the refresh cycle fails
to refresh the victim row fast enough, that leads to bit flips.
Once bit flips are found, they can be exploited by placing any
security-critical data structure or code page at that particu-
lar location and triggering the bit flip again [16, 47, 60]. The
Rowhammer attack requires fast access to the same DRAM
cells by bypassing the CPU cache, e.g., using clflush [29].
Additionally, cache eviction based on an eviction set can
also result in access to DRAM cells when clflush is not
available [3, 18]. Efficiently building eviction sets may thus
also enhance Rowhammer attacks. For a successful Rowham-
mer attack, it is essential to collocate multiple memory pages
within the same bank and adjacent to each other. A number
of physical address bits, depending on the hardware configu-
ration, are used to map memory pages to banks [45]. Since
the rows are generally placed sequentially within the banks,
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Figure 1: The Memory Order Buffer includes circular buffers
SDB, SAB and LB. SDB, SAB and PAB of the DCACHE
have the same number of entries. SAB may initially hold the
virtual address and the partial physical address. MOB requests
the TLB to translate the virtual address and update the PAB
with the translated physical address.
access to adjacent rows within the same bank can be achieved
if we have access to contiguous physical pages.
2.5 Memory Order Buffer
The processor manages memory operations using the Memory
Order Buffer (MOB). MOB is tightly coupled with the data
cache. The MOB assures that memory operations are executed
efficiently by following the Intel memory ordering rule [39]
in which memory stores are executed in-order and memory
loads can be executed out-of-order. These rules have been
enforced to improve the efficiency of memory accesses, while
guaranteeing their correct commitment. Figure 1 shows the
MOB schematic according to Intel [1, 2]. The MOB includes
circular buffers, store buffer1 and load buffer (LB). A store
will be decoded into two micro ops to store the address and
data, respectively, to the store buffer. The store buffer enables
the processor to continue executing other instructions before
commitment of the stores. As a result, the pipeline does not
have to stall for the stores to complete. This further enables
the MOB to support out-of-order execution of the load.
Store forwarding is an optimization mechanism that sends
the store data to a load if the load address matches any of
the store buffer entries. This is a speculative process, since
the MOB cannot determine the true dependency of the load
on stores based on the store buffer. Intel’s implementation
of the store buffer is undocumented, but a potential design
suggests that it will only hold the virtual address, and it may
include part of the physical address [1, 2, 31]. As a result, the
processor may falsely forward the data, although the physical
addresses do not match. The complete resolution will be de-
layed until the load commitment, since the MOB needs to ask
1Store buffer consists of Store Address Buffer (SAB) and Store Data Buffer
(SDB). For simplicity, we use Store Buffer to mention the logically combined
SAB and SDB units.
the TLB for the complete physical address information, which
is time consuming. Additionally, the data cache (DCACHE)
may hold the translated store addresses in a Physical Address
Buffer (PAB) with equal number of entries as the store buffer.
3 Speculative Load Hazards
As we mentioned earlier, memory loads can be executed
out-of-order and before the preceding memory stores. If
one of the preceding stores modifies the content of a lo-
cation in memory, the memory load address is referring to,
out-of-order execution of the load will operate on stale data,
which results in invalid execution of a program. This out-of-
order execution of the memory load is a speculative behavior,
since there is no guarantee during the execution time of the
load that the virtual addresses corresponding to the memory
stores do not conflict with the load address after translation
to physical addresses. Figure 2 demonstrates this effect on
a hypothetical processor with 7 pipeline stages. As multiple
stores may be blocked due to limited resources, the execu-
tion of the load and dependent instructions in the pipeline, the
load block, will bypass the stores since the MOB assumes
the load block to be independent of the stores. This specula-
tive behavior improves the memory bottleneck by letting other
instructions continue their execution. However, if the depen-
dency of the load and preceding stores is not verified, the
load block may be computed on incorrect data which is either
falsely forwarded by store forwarding (false dependency), or
loaded from a stale cache line (unresolved true dependency).
If the processor detects a false dependency before committing
the load, it has to flush the pipeline and re-execute the load
block. This will cause observable performance penalties and
timing behavior.
3.1 Dependency Resolution
Dependency checks and resolution occur in multiple stages
depending on the availability of the address information in the
store buffer. A load instruction needs to be checked against
all preceding stores in the store buffer to avoid false depen-
dencies and to ensure the correctness of the data. A potential
design [20, 31],2 suggests the following stages for the depen-
dency check and resolution, as shown in Figure 3:
1. Loosenet: The first stage is the loosenet check where
the page offsets of the load and stores are compared3.
In case of a loosenet hit, the compared load and store
may be dependent and the processor will proceed to the
next check stage.
2The implementation of the MOB used in Intel processors is unpublished
and therefore we cannot be certain about the precise architecture. Our results
agree with some of the possible designs that are described in the Intel patents.
3According to Ld_Blocks_Partial:Address_Alias Hardware Perfor-
mance Counter (HPC) event [24], loosenet is defined by Intel as the mecha-
nism that only compare the page offsets.
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Figure 3: The dependency check logic: loosenet initially
checks the least 12 significant bits (page offset) and the finenet
checks the upper address bits, related to the page number. The
final dependency using the physical address matching might
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2. Finenet: The next stage, called finenet, uses upper ad-
dress bits. The finenet can be implemented to check the
upper virtual address bits [20], or the physical address
tag [31]. Either way, it is an intermediate stage, and it is
not the final dependency resolution. In case of a finenet
hit, the processor blocks the load and/or forwards the
store data, otherwise, the dependency resolution will go
into the final stage.
3. Physical Address Matching: At the final stage, the
physical addresses will be checked. Since this stage is
the final chance to resolve potential false dependencies,
we expect the full physical address to be checked. How-
ever, one possible design suggests that if the physical ad-
dresses are not available, the physical address matching
returns true and continues with the store forwarding [20].
Since the page offset is identical between the virtual and phys-
ical address, loosenet can be performed as soon as the store
is decoded. [2] suggests that the store buffer only holds bit
19 to 12 of the physical address. Although the PAB holds the
full translated physical address, it is not clear in which stage
this information can be available to the MOB. As a result,
the finenet check may be implemented based on checking the
partial physical address bits. As we verify later, the depen-
dency resolution logic may fail to resolve the dependency at
multiple intermediate stages due to unavailability of the full
physical address.
4 The SPOILER Attack
The attack model for SPOILER is the same as Rowhammer
and cache attacks where the attacker’s code is needed to be
executed on the same underlying hardware as of the victim.
As described in Section 3, speculative loads may face other
aliasing conditions in addition to the 4K aliasing, due to the
partial checks on the higher address bits. To confirm this, we
design an experiment to observe timing behavior of a specu-
lative load based on higher address bits. For this purpose, we
propose Algorithm 1 that executes a speculative load after
multiple stores and further make sure to fill the store buffer
with addresses that cause 4K aliasing during the execution of
the load. Having w as the window size, the algorithm iterates
over a number of different memory pages, and for each page, it
performs stores to that page and all previous w pages within
a window. Since the size of the store buffer varies between
different processor generations, we choose a big enough win-
dow (w = 64) to ensure that the load has 4K aliasing with
the maximum number of entries in the store buffer and hence
maximum potential conflicts. Following the stores, we mea-
sure the timing of a load operation from a different memory
page, as defined by x. Since we want the load to be executed
speculatively, we can not use a store fence such as mfence be-
fore the load. As a result, our measurements are an estimate
of execution time for the speculatively load and nearby mi-
croarchitectural events. This may include a negligible portion
of overhead for the execution of stores, and/or any delay due
to the dependency resolution. If we iterate over a diverse set
of addresses with different virtual and physical page numbers,
but the same page offset, we should be able to monitor any
discrepancy.
Algorithm 1 Address Aliasing
for p from w to PAGE_COUNT do
for i from w to 0 do
data store−−→ bu f f er[(p− i)×PAGE_SIZE]
end for
t1 = rdtscp()
data load←−− bu f f er[x×PAGE_SIZE]
t2 = rdtscp()
measure[p]← t2− t1
end for
return measure
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Figure 4: SPOILER’s timing measurements and hardware per-
formance counters recorded simultaneously.
4.1 Speculative Dependency Analysis
In this section, we use Algorithm 1 and Hardware Perfor-
mance Counters (HPC) to perform an empirical analysis of
the dependency resolution logic. HPCs can keep track of
low-level hardware-related events in the CPU. The counters
are accessible via special purpose registers and can be used
to analyze the performance of a program. They provide a
powerful tool to detect microarchitectural components that
cause bottlenecks. Software libraries such as Performance
Application Programming Interface (PAPI) [51] simplifies
programming and reading low-level HPC on Intel processors.
Initially, we execute Algorithm 1 for 1000 different virtual
pages. Figure 4(a) shows the cycle count for each iteration
with a set of 4 kB aliased store addresses. Interestingly, we
observe multiple step-wise peaks with a very high latency.
Then, we use PAPI to monitor 30 different performance coun-
ters listed in Table 5 in the appendix while running the same
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Figure 5: Correlation with HPCs listed in Table 5 in
the appendix. Ld_Blocks_Partial:Address_Alias and
Cycle_Activity:Stalls_Ldm_Pending (both dotted red)
have strong positive and negative correlations, respectively.
experiment. At each iteration, only one performance counter
is monitored alongside the aforementioned timing measure-
ment. After each speculative load, the performance counter
value and the load time are both recorded. Finally, we obtain
the timings and performance counter value pairs as depicted
in Figure 4.
To find any relation between the observed high latency
and a particular event, we compute correlation coefficients
between counters and the timing measurements. Since the
latency only occurs in the small region of the trace where the
timing increases, we only need to compute the correlation on
these regions. When an increase of at least 200 clock cycles
is detected, the next s values from timing and the HPC traces
are used to calculate the correlations, where s is the number
of steps from Table 1 and 200 is the average execution time
for a load.
As shown in Figure 5, two events have a high correla-
tion with the leakage: Cycle_Activity:Stalls_Ldm_Pending
has the highest correlation of 0.985. This event shows
the number of cycles for which the execution is stalled
and no instructions are executed due to a pending load.
Ld_Blocks_Partial:Address_Alias has an inverse correla-
tion with the leakage. This event counts the number of false de-
pendencies in the MOB when loosenet resolves the 4K alias-
ing condition. Separately, Exe_Activity:Bound_on_Stores
increases with more number of stores within the inner
window loop in Algorithm 1, but it does not have a cor-
relation with the leakage. The reason behind this behav-
ior is that the store buffer is full, and additional store op-
erations are pending. However, since there is no correla-
tion with the leakage, this shows that the timing behavior
is not due to the stores delay. We also attempt to profile
any existing counters related to the memory disambigua-
tion. However, the events Memory_Disambiguation.Success
and Memory_Disambiguation.Reset are not available on the
modern architectures that are tested.
CPU Model Architecture Steps SB Size
Intel Core i7-8650U Kaby Lake R 22 56
Intel Core i7-7700 Kaby Lake 22 56
Intel Core i5-6440HQ Skylake 22 56
Intel Xeon E5-2640v3 Haswell 17 42
Intel Xeon E5-2670v2 Ivy Bridge EP 14 36
Intel Core i7-3770 Ivy Bridge 12 36
Intel Core i7-2670QM Sandy Bridge 12 36
Intel Core i5-2400 Sandy Bridge 12 36
Intel Core i5 650 Nehalem 11 32
Intel Core2Duo T9400 Core N/A 20
Qualcomm Kryo 280 ARMv8-A N/A *
AMD A6-4455M Bulldozer N/A *
Table 1: 1 MB aliasing on various architectures: The tested
AMD and ARM architectures, and Intel Core generation do
not show similar effects. The Store Buffer (SB) sizes are
gathered from Intel Manual [24] and wikichip.org [57–59].
4.2 Leakage of the Physical Address Mapping
In this experiment, we evaluate whether the observed step-
wise latency has any relationship with the physical page num-
bers by observing the pagemap file. As shown in Figure 6,
we observe step-wise peaks with a very high latency which
appear once in every 256 pages on average.The 20 least sig-
nificant bits of physical address for the load matches with
the physical addresses of the stores where high peaks for
virtual pages are observed. In our experiments, we always
detect peaks with different virtual addresses, which have the
matching least 20 bits of physical address. This observation
clearly discovers the existence of 1 MB aliasing effect based
on the physical addresses. This 1 MB aliasing leaks informa-
tion about 8 bits of mapping that were unknown to the user
space processes.
Matching this observation with the previously observed
Cycle_Activity:Stalls_Ldm_Pending with a high correla-
tion, the speculative load has been stalled to resolve the depen-
dency with conflicting store buffer entries after the occurrence
of a 1 MB aliased address. This observation verifies that the
latency is due to the pending load. When the latency is at
the highest point, Ld_Blocks_Partial:Address_Alias drops
to zero, and it increments at each down step of the peak. This
implies that the loosenet check does not resolve the rest of the
store dependencies whenever there is a 1 MB aliased address
in the store buffer.
4.3 Evaluation
In the previous experiment, the execution time of the load
operation that is delayed by 1 MB aliasing decreases gradually
in each iteration (Figure 6). The number of steps to reach the
normal execution time is consistent on the same processor.
When the first store in the window loop accesses a memory
address with the matching 1 MB aliased address, the latency is
at its highest point, marked as “1” in Figure 6. As the window
loop accesses this address later in the loop, it appears closer
to the load with a lower latency like the steps marked as 5, 15
and 22. This observation matches the carry chain algorithm
described by Intel [20] where the aliasing check starts from
the most recent store. As shown in Table 1, experimenting
with various processor generations shows that the number of
steps has a linear correlation with the size of the store buffer
which is architecture dependent. While the leakage exists on
all Intel Core processors starting from the first generation,
the timing effect is higher for the more recent generations
with a bigger store buffer size. The analyzed ARM and AMD
processors do not show similar behavior4.
As our time measurement for speculative load suggests, it
is not possible to reason whether the high timing is due to a
very slow load or commitment of store operations. If the step-
wise delay matches the store buffer entries, this delay may be
either due to the the dependency resolution logic performing
a pipeline flush and restart of the load for each 4 kB aliased
entry starting from the 1 MB aliased entry, or due to the load
waiting for all the remaining stores to commit because of
an unresolved hazard. To explore this further, we perform an
additional experiment with all store addresses replaced with
non-aliased addresses except for one. This experiment shows
that the peak disappears if there is only a single 4 kB and
1 MB aliased address in the store buffer.
Lastly, we run the same experiments on a shuffled set of vir-
tual addresses to assure that the contiguous virtual addresses
may not affect the observed leakage. Our experiment with the
shuffled virtual addresses exactly match the same step-wise
behavior suggesting that the upper bits in virtual addresses do
not affect the leakage behavior, and the leakage is solely due
to the aliasing on physical address bits.
4.3.1 Comparison of Address Aliasing Scenarios
We further test other address combinations to compare ad-
ditional address aliasing scenarios using Algorithm 1. As
shown by Figure 7, when stores and the load access dif-
ferent cache sets without aliasing, the load is executed in
30 cycles, which is the typical timing for an L1 data cache
load including the rdtscp overhead. When the stores have
different memory addresses with the same page offset, but
the load has a different offset, the load takes 100 cycles to
execute. This shows that even memory addresses in the store
buffer having 4K Aliasing conditions with each other that
are totally unrelated to the speculative load create a memory
bottleneck for the load. In the next scenario, 4K aliasing be-
tween the load and all stores, the average load time is about
200 cycles. While the aforementioned 4K aliasing scenarios
may leak cross domain information about memory accesses
4We use rdtscp for Intel and AMD processors and the clock_gettime
for ARM processors to perform the time measurements.
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Figure 6: Step-wise peaks with 22 steps and a high latency can be observed on some of the pages (Core i7-8650U processor).
Figure 7: Histogram of the measurement for the speculative
load with various store addresses. Load will be fast, 30 cy-
cles, without any dependency. If there exists 4K aliasing only
between the stores, the average is 100. The average is 200
when there is 4K aliasing of load and stores. The 1 MB
aliasing has a distinctive high latency.
( Section 7), the most interesting scenario is the 1 MB aliasing
which takes more than 1200 cycles for the highest point in
the peak. For simplicity, we refer to the 1 MB aliased address
as aliased address, in the rest of the paper.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 The Curious Case of Memory Disambiguation
The processor uses an additional speculative engine, called
the memory disambiguator [10, 32], to predict memory false
dependencies and reduce the chance of their occurrences. The
main idea is to predict if a load is independent of preceding
stores and proceed with the execution of the load by ignor-
ing the store buffer. The predictor uses a hash table that is
indexed with the address of the load, and each entry of the
hash table has a saturating counter. If the pre-commitment
dependency resolution does not detect false dependencies,
the counter is incremented, otherwise it will be reset to zero.
After multiple successful executions of the same load instruc-
tion, the predictor assumes that the load is safe to execute.
Every time the counter resets to zero, the next iteration of the
load will be blocked to be checked against the store buffer
entries. Mispredictions result in performance overhead due to
pipeline flushes. To avoid repeated mispredictions, a watch-
dog mechanism monitors the success rate of the prediction,
and it can temporarily disable the memory disambiguator.
The predictor of the memory disambiguator should go into
a stable state after the first few iterations, since the mem-
ory load is always truly independent of any aliased store.
Hence the saturating counter for the target speculative load
address passes the threshold, and it never resets due to a false
prediction. As a result, the memory disambiguator should
always fetch the data into the cache without any access to the
store buffer. However, since the memory disambiguation per-
forms speculation, the dependency resolution at some point
verifies the prediction. The misprediction watchdog is also
supposed to only disable the memory disambiguator when
the misprediction rate is high, but in this case we should have
a high prediction rate. Accordingly, the observed leakage oc-
curs after the disambiguation and during the last stages of
dependency resolution, i.e., the memory disambiguator only
performs prediction on the 4K aliasing at the initial loosenet
check, and it cannot protect the pipeline from 1 MB aliasing
that appears at a later stage.
4.4.2 Hyperthreading Effect
Similar to the 4K Aliasing [40, 49], we empirically test
whether the 1 MB aliasing can be used as a covert/side chan-
nel through logical processors. Our observation shows that
when we run our experiments on two logical processors on
the same physical core, the number of steps in the peaks is
exactly halved. This matches the description by Intel [24]
where it is stated that the store buffer is split between the
logical processors. As a result, the 1 MB aliasing effect is not
visible and exploitable across logical cores. [31] suggests
that loosenet checks mask out the stores on the opposite
thread.
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Figure 8: Reverse engineering physical page mappings in
JavaScript. The markers point to addresses having same 20
bits of physical addresses being part of the same eviction set.
5 SPOILER from JavaScript
Microarchitectural attacks from JavaScript have a high impact
as drive-by attacks in the browser can be accomplished with-
out any privilege or physical proximity. In such attacks, co-
location is automatically granted by the fact that the browser
loads a website with malicious embedded JavaScript code.
The browsers provide a sandbox where some instructions like
clflush and prefetch and file systems such as procfs are
inaccessible, limiting the opportunity for attack. Genkin et
al. [14] showed that side-channel attacks inside a browser
can be performed more efficiently and with greater porta-
bility through the use of WebAssembly.Yet, WebAssembly
introduces an additional abstraction layer, i.e. it emulates
a 32-bit environment that translates the internal addresses
to virtual addresses of the host process (the browser). We-
bAssembly only uses addresses of the emulated environment
and similar to JavaScript, it does not have direct access to
the virtual addresses. Using SPOILER from JavaScript opens
the opportunity to puncture these abstraction layers and to
obtain physical address information directly. Figure 8 shows
the address search in JavaScript using SPOILER. Compared
to native implementations, we replace the rdtscp measure-
ment with a timer based on a shared array buffer [19]. We
cannot use any fence instruction such as lfence, and as a
result, there remains some negligible noise in the JavaScript
implementation. However, the aliased addresses can still be
clearly seen, and we can use this information to improve the
state-of-the art eviction set creation for both Rowhammer and
cache attacks.
5.1 Efficient Eviction Set Finding
We use the algorithm proposed in [14]. It is a slight improve-
ment to the former state-of-the-art brute force method [42]
and consists of three phases:
• expand: A large pool of addresses P is allocated with the
last twelve bits of all addresses being zero. A random
address is picked as a witness t and tested against a
candidate set C. If t is not evicted by C, it is added to
C and a new witness will be picked. As soon as t gets
evicted by C, C forms an eviction set for t.
• contract: Addresses are subsequently removed from the
eviction set. If the set still evicts t, the next address is
removed. If it does not evict t anymore, the removed
address is added back to the eviction set. At the end of
this phase, we have a minimal eviction set of the size of
the set associativity.
• collect: All addresses mapping to the already found evic-
tion set are removed from P by testing if they are evicted
by the found set. After finding 128 initial cache sets, this
approach utilizes the linearity property of the cache: For
each found eviction set, the bits 6-11 are enumerated
instead. This provides 63 more eviction sets for each
found set, leading to full cache coverage.
We test this approach on an Intel Core i7-4770 with four
physical cores and a shared 8MB 16-way L3 cache with
Chromium 68.0.3440.106, Firefox 62 and Firefox Developer
Edition 63. The approach yields an 80% accuracy rate to find
all 8192 eviction sets when starting with a pool of 4096 pages.
The entire eviction set creation process takes an average of
46s. We improve the algorithm by 1) using the addresses
removed from the eviction set in the contract phase as a new
candidate set and 2) removing more than one address at a time
from the eviction set during the contract phase. The improved
eviction set creation process takes 35s on average.
5.1.1 Evaluation
The probability of finding a congruent address is P(C) =
2γ−c−s, where c is the number of bits determining the cache
set, γ is the number of bits attackers know, and s is the num-
ber of slices [56]. Since SPOILER allows us to control γ≥ c
bits, we are only left with uncertainty about a few address
bits that influence the slice selection algorithm [26]. In the-
ory, the eviction set search is sped up by a factor of 4096
by using aliased addresses in the pool, since on average one
of 28 instead of one of 220 addresses is an aliased address.
Additionally, the address pool is much smaller, where 115
addresses are enough to find all the eviction sets. In native
code, the overhead involved in finding the aliased addresses
is negligible, less than a second in our experiments. However,
in JavaScript, due to the noise, it takes 9s for finding aliased
addresses and then 3s for eviction set as compared to the base-
line of 46s for classic method in Table 2. Success rate however
is 100% with SPOILER as compared to 80% for the classic
method. Besides, success rate of the classical method can be
affected by the availability and consumption of memory on
the system.
From each aliased address pool, 4 eviction sets can be found
(corresponding to the 4 slices which are the only unknown
Algorithm R ttotal tAAS tESS Success
Classic [42] 3 46s - 100% 80%
Improved [14] 3 35s - 100% 80%
AA (ours) 10 10s 54% 46% 67%
AA (ours) 20 12s 75% 25% 100%
Table 2: Comparison of different eviction set finding algo-
rithms on an Intel Core i7-4770. Classic is the method from
[42], improved is the same method with slight improvement,
Aliased Address (AA) uses SPOILER. tAAS is the time percent-
age used for finding aliased addresses. tESS is the time per-
centage for finding eviction sets. R is the number of Rounds.
part in the mapping). These can be enumerated again to form
63 more eviction sets since we still kept the bits 6-11 fixed. To
accomplish full cache coverage, the aliased address pool has
to be constructed 32 times. The SPOILER variant for finding
eviction sets is more susceptible to system noise, which is why
it needs more repetitions i.e. R rounds to get reliable values.
On the other hand, it is less prone to values deviating largely
from the mean, which is a problem in the classic eviction
set creation algorithm. The classic method does not succeed
about one out of five times in our experiments, as shown in
Table 2. The unsuccessful attempts occur due to aborts if the
algorithm takes much longer than statistically expected. As a
result, SPOILER can be incorporated in an end-to-end attack
such as drive-by key-extraction cache attacks by Genkin et
al. [14]. SPOILER increases both speed and reliability of the
eviction set finding and therefore the entire attack.
6 Rowhammer Attack using SPOILER
To perform a Rowhammer attack, the adversary needs to ef-
ficiently access DRAM rows adjacent to a victim row. In a
single-sided Rowhammer attack, only one row is activated
repeatedly to induce bit flips on one of the nearby rows. For
this purpose, the attacker needs to make sure that multiple
virtual pages co-locate on the same bank. The probability of
co-locating on the same bank is low without the knowledge of
physical addresses and their mapping to memory banks. In a
double-sided Rowhammer attack, the attacker tries to access
two different rows n+ 1 an n− 1 to induce bit flips in the
row n placed between them. While double-sided Rowham-
mer attacks induce bit flips faster due to the extra charge on
the nearby cells of the victim row n, they further require ac-
cess to contiguous memory pages. In this section, we show
that SPOILER can help boosting both single and double-sided
Rowhammer attacks by its additional 8-bit physical address
information and resulting detection of contiguous memory.
System Model DRAM Configuration # of Bits
Dell XPS-L702x 1 x (4GB 2Rx8) 21
(Sandy Bridge) 2 x (4GB 2Rx8) 22
Dell Inspiron-580 1 x (2GB 2Rx8) (b) 21
(Nehalem) 2 x (2GB 2Rx8) (c) 22
4 x (2GB 2Rx8) (d) 23
Dell Optiplex-7010 1 x (2GB 1Rx8) (a) 19
(Ivy Bridge) 2 x (2GB 1Rx8) 20
1 x (4GB 2Rx8) (e) 21
2 x (4GB 2Rx8) 22
Table 3: Reverse engineering the DRAM memory mappings
using DRAMA tool, # of Bits represents the number of physi-
cal address bits used for the bank, rank and channel [45].
6.1 DRAM Bank Co-location
DRAMA [45] reverse engineered the memory controller map-
ping. This requires elevated privileges to access physical ad-
dresses from the pagemap file. The authors have suggested
that prefetch side-channel attacks [17] may be used to gain
physical address information instead. SPOILER is an alterna-
tive way to obtain partial address information and is still fea-
sible when the prefetch instruction is not available, e.g. in
JavaScript. In our approach, we use SPOILER to detect aliased
virtual memory addresses where the 20 LSBs of the physical
addresses match. The memory controller uses these bits for
mapping the physical addresses to the DRAM banks [45].
Even though the memory controller may use additional bits,
the majority of the bits are known using SPOILER. An at-
tacker can directly hammer such aliased addresses to perform
a more efficient single-sided Rowhammer attack with a sig-
nificantly increased probability of hitting the same bank. As
shown in Table 3, we reverse engineer the DRAM mappings
for different hardware configurations using the DRAMA tool,
and only a few bits of physical address entropy beyond the 20
bits will remain unknown.
To verify if our aliased virtual addresses co-locate on the
same bank, we use the row conflict side channel as proposed
in [13] (timings in the appendix, Section 10.2). We observe
that whenever the number of physical address bits used by
the memory controller to map data to physical memory is
equal to or less than 20, we always hit the same bank. For
each additional bit the memory controller uses, the probabil-
ity of hitting the same bank is divided by 2 as there is one
more bit of entropy. In general, we can formulate that our
probability p to hit the same bank is p = 1/2n, where n is
the number of unknown physical address bits in the mapping.
We experimentally verify the success rate for the setups listed
in Table 3, as depicted in Figure 9. In summary, SPOILER
drastically improves the efficiency of finding addresses map-
ping to the same bank without administrative privilege or
reverse engineering the memory controller mapping.
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Figure 9: Bank co-location for various DRAM configurations
(a), (b), (c) & (d) from Table 3. The regularity of the peaks
shows that the allocated memory was contiguous, which is
coincidental.
6.2 Contiguous Memory
For a double-sided Rowhammer attack, we need to hammer
rows adjacent to the victim row in the same bank. This re-
quires detecting contiguous memory pages in the allocated
memory, since the rows are written to the banks sequentially.
Without contiguous memory, the banks will be filled randomly
and we will not be able to locate neighboring rows. We show
that an attacker can use SPOILER to detect contiguous memory
using 1 MB aliasing peaks. For this purpose, we compare the
physical frame numbers to the SPOILER leakage for 10000
different virtual pages allocated using malloc. Figure 10
shows the relation between 1 MB aliasing peaks and physical
page frame numbers. When the distance between the peaks
is random, the trend of frame numbers also change randomly.
After around 5000 pages, we observe that the frame numbers
increase sequentially. The number of pages between the peaks
remains constant at 256 where this distance comes from the 8
bits of physical address leakage due to 1 MB aliasing.
We also compare the accuracy of obtaining contiguous
memory detected by SPOILER by analyzing the actual physi-
cal addresses from the pagemap file. By checking the differ-
ence between physical page numbers for each detected virtual
page, we can determine the accuracy of our detection method:
the success rate for finding contiguous memory is above 99%
disregarding the availability of the contiguous pages. For de-
tailed experiment on the availability of the contiguous pages,
see Section 10.3 in the appendix.
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Figure 10: Relation between leakage peaks and the physical
page numbers. The dotted plot shows the leakage peaks from
SPOILER. The solid plot shows the decimal values of the phys-
ical frame numbers from the pagemap file. Once the peaks
in the dotted plot become regular, the solid plot is linearly
increasing, which shows contiguous memory allocation.
6.3 Double-Sided Rowhammer with SPOILER
As double-sided Rowhammer attacks are based on the as-
sumption that rows within a bank are contiguous, we mount a
practical double-sided Rowhammer attack on several DRAM
modules using SPOILER without any root privileges. First,
we use SPOILER to detect a suitable amount of contiguous
memory. If enough contiguous memory is available in the
system, SPOILER finds it, otherwise a double-sided Rowham-
mer attack is not feasible. In our experiments, we empirically
configure SPOILER to detect 10 MB of contiguous memory.
Second, we apply the row conflict side channel only to the
located contiguous memory, and get a list of virtual addresses
which are contiguously mapped within a bank. Finally, we
start performing a double-sided Rowhammer attack by se-
lecting 3 consecutive addresses from our list. While we have
demonstrated the bit flips in our own process, we can free that
memory which can then be assigned to a victim process by
using previously known techniques like spraying and memory
waylaying [16]. As the bit flips are highly reproducible, we
can again flip the same bits in the victim process to demon-
strate a full attack. Table 4 shows some of the DRAM modules
susceptible to Rowhammer attack.
The native version of Rowhammer in this work is also ap-
plicable in JavaScript. The JavaScript-only variant implemen-
tation of Rowhammer by Gruss et al. [18], named rowham-
mer.js5, can be combined with SPOILER to implement an
end-to-end attack. In the original rowhammer.js, 2MB huge
pages were assumed to get a contiguous chunk of physical
memory. With SPOILER, this assumption is no longer required
as explained in Section 6.3.
Figure 11 shows the number of hammers compared to the
the amount of bit flips for configuration (e) in Table 3. We
5https://github.com/IAIK/rowhammerjs
DRAM Model Architecture Flippy
M378B5273DH0-CK0 Ivy Bridge X
M378B5273DH0-CK0 Sandy Bridge X
M378B5773DH0-CH9 Sandy Bridge X
M378B5173EB0-CK0 Sandy Bridge ×
NT2GC64B88G0NF-CG Sandy Bridge ×
KY996D-ELD Sandy Bridge ×
M378B5773DH0-CH9 Nehalem X
NT4GC64B8HG0NS-CG Sandy Bridge ×
HMA41GS6AFR8N-TF Skylake ×
Table 4: DRAM modules susceptible to double-sided
Rowhammer attack using SPOILER.
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Figure 11: Amount of bit flips increases with the increase in
number of hammerings. The timings do not include the time
taken for reboots and 1 minute sleep time.
repeat this experiment 30 times for every measurement and
the results are then averaged out. On every experiment, the
system is rebooted using a script because once the memory
becomes fragmented, no more contiguous memory is avail-
able. The number of bit flips increases with more number of
hammerings. Hammering for 500 million times is found to
be an optimal number for this DRAM configuration, as the
continuation of hammering is not increasing bit flips.
7 Tracking Speculative Loads With SPOILER
Single-threaded attacks can be used to steal information from
other security contexts running before/after the attacker code
on the same thread [8, 41]. Example scenarios are I) context
switches between processes of different users, or II) between
a user process and a kernel thread, and III) Intel Software
Guard eXtensions (SGX) secure enclaves [41, 54]. In such at-
tacks, the adversary puts the microarchitecture to a particular
state, waits for the context switch and execution of the victim
thread, and then tries to observe the microarchitectural state
after the victim’s execution. We propose an attack where the
adversary 1) fills the store buffer with arbitrary addresses, 2)
issues the victim context switch and lets the victim perform a
secret-dependent memory access, and 3) measures the execu-
tion time of the victim. Any correlation between the victim’s
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Figure 12: The depth of SPOILER leakage with respect to
different instructions and execution units.
timing and the load address can leak secrets [61]. Due to
the nature of SPOILER, the victim should access the memory
while there are aliased addresses in the store buffer, i.e. if the
stores are committed before the victim’s speculative load,
there will be no dependency resolution hazard.
We first perform an analysis of the depth of the operations
that can be executed between the stores and the load to
investigate the viability of SPOILER. In this experiment, we
repeat a number of instructions between stores and the load
that are free from memory operations. Figure 12 shows the
number of stall steps due to the dependency hazard with the
added instructions. Although nop is not supposed to take any
cycle, adding 4000 nop will diffuse the timing latency. Then,
we test add and leal, which use the Arithmetic Logic Unit
(ALU) and the Address Generation Unit (AGU), respectively.
Figure 12 shows that only 1000 adds can be executed be-
tween the stores and load before the SPOILER effect is lost.
Since each add typically takes about 1 cycle to execute, this
roughly gives a 1000 cycle depth for SPOILER. Considering
the observed depth, we discuss potential attacks that can track
the speculative load in the following two scenarios.
7.1 SPOILER Context Switch
In this attack, we are interested in tracking a memory access in
the privileged kernel environment after a context switch. First,
we fill the store buffer with addresses that have the same page
offset, and then execute a system call. During the execution
of the system call, we expect to observe a delayed execution
if a secret load address has aliasing with the stores. We
utilize SPOILER to iterate over various virtual pages, thus
some of the pages have more noticeable latency due to the
1 MB aliasing. We analyze multiple syscalls with various
execution times. For instance, Figure 13 shows the execution
time for mincore. In the first experiment (red/1 MB Conflict),
we fill the store buffer with addresses that have aliasing with
a memory load operation in the kernel code space. The 1 MB
aliasing delay with 7 steps suggests that we can track the
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Figure 13: Execution time of mincore system call. When a
kernel load address has aliasing with the attacker’s stores
(red/1MB Conflict), the step-wise delay will appear. These
timings are measured with Kernel Page Table Isolation dis-
abled.
address of a kernel memory load by the knowledge of our
arbitrary filled store addresses. The blue (No Conflict) line
shows the timing when there is no aliasing between the target
memory load and the attackers store. Surprisingly, only by
filling the store buffer, the system call executes much slower:
the normal execution time for mincore should be around
250 cycles (cyan/No Store). This proof of concept shows
that SPOILER can be used to leak information from more
privileged contexts, however this is limited only to loads that
appear at the beginning of the next context.
7.2 Negative Result: SPOILER SGX
In this experiment, we try to combine SPOILER with the
CacheZoom [41] approach to create a novel single-threaded
side-channel attack against SGX enclaves with high temporal
and spatial resolution (4-byte) [40]. We use SGX-STEP [53]
to precisely interrupt every single instruction. Nemesis [54]
shows that the interrupt handler context switch time is depen-
dent on the execution time of the currently running instruction.
On our test platform, Core i7-8650U, each context switch on
an enclave takes about 12000 cycles to execute. If we fill
the store buffer with memory addresses that match the page
offset of a load inside the enclave in the interrupt handler,
the context switch timing is increased to about 13500 cycles.
While we cannot observe any correlation between the matched
4 kB or 1 MB aliased addresses, we do see unexpected peri-
odic downward peaks with a similar step-wise behavior as
SPOILER(Figure 14). We later reproduce a similar behavior
by running SPOILER before an ioctl routine that flushes
the TLB on each call. Intel SGX also performs an implicit
TLB flush during each context switch. We can thus infer that
the downward peaks occur due to the TLB flush, especially
since the addresses for the downward peaks do not have any
address correlation with the load address. This suggests that
the TLB flush operation itself is affected by SPOILER. This
effect eliminates the opportunity to observe any potential cor-
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Figure 14: The effect of SPOILER on TLB flush. The execu-
tion cycle always increases for 4 kB aliased addresses, except
for some of the virtual pages inside in the store buffer where
we observe step-wise hills.
relation due to the speculative load. As a result, we can not
use SPOILER to track memory accesses inside an enclave.
Further exploration of the root cause of the TLB flush effect
can be carried out as a future work.
8 Mitigations
Software Mitigations The attack exploits the fact that when
there is a load instruction after a number of store instruc-
tions, the physical address conflict causes a high timing be-
havior. This happens because of the speculatively executed
load before all the stores are finished executing. There is
no software mitigation that can completely erase this prob-
lem. While the timing behavior can be removed by inserting
store fences between the loads and stores, this cannot be
enforced to the user’s code space, i.e., the user can always
leak the physical address information. Another yet less robust
approach is to execute other instructions between the loads
and stores to decrease the depth of the attack. However,
both of the approaches are only applicable to defend against
attacks such as the one described in Section 7.
As for most attacks on JavaScript, removing accurate timers
from the browser would be effective against SPOILER. Indeed,
some timers have been removed or distorted by jitters as a
response to attacks [35]. There is however a wide range of
timers with varying precision available, and removing all of
them seems impractical [13, 46].
When it is not possible to mitigate the microarchitectural
attacks, developers can use dynamic tools to at least de-
tect the presence of such leakage [6, 9, 63]. One of the dy-
namic approaches is gained by monitoring hardware perfor-
mance counters in real-time. As explained in Section 4.1, two
of the counters Ld_Blocks_Partial:Address_Alias and
Cycle_Activity:Stalls_Ldm_Pending have high correla-
tions with the leakage.
Hardware Mitigations The hardware design for the mem-
ory disambiguator may be revised to prevent such physical
address leakage, but modifying the speculative behavior may
cause performance impacts. For instance, partial address com-
parison was a design choice for performance. Full address
comparison may address this vulnerability, but will also im-
pact performance. Moreover, hardware patches are difficult to
be applied to legacy systems and take years to be deployed.
9 Conclusion
We introduced SPOILER, a novel approach for gaining phys-
ical address information by exploiting a new information
leakage due to speculative execution. To exploit the leakage,
we used the speculative load behavior after jamming the store
buffer. SPOILER can be executed from user space and requires
no special privileges. We exploited the leakage to reveal in-
formation on the 8 least significant bits of the physical page
number, which are critical for many microarchitectural at-
tacks such as Rowhammer and cache attacks. We analyzed
the causes of the discovered leakage in detail and showed how
to exploit it to extract physical address information.
Further, we showed the impact of SPOILER by performing
a highly targeted Rowhammer attack in a native user-level
environment. We further demonstrated the applicability of
SPOILER in sandboxed environments by constructing effi-
cient eviction sets from JavaScript, an extremely restrictive
environment that usually does not grant any access to physical
addresses. Gaining even partial knowledge of the physical
address will make new attack targets feasible in browsers even
though JavaScript-enabled attacks are known to be difficult to
realize in practice due to the limited nature of the JavaScript
environment. Broadly put, the leakage described in this paper
will enable attackers to perform existing attacks more effi-
ciently, or to devise new attacks using the novel knowledge.
The source code for SPOILER is available on GitHub6.
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10 Appendix
10.1 Tested Hardware Performance Counters
Counters Correlation
UNHALTED_CORE_CYCLES 0.3077
UNHALTED_REFERENCE_CYCLES 0.1527
INSTRUCTION_RETIRED 0.2718
INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED 0.2827
BRANCH_INSTRUCTIONS_RETIRED 0.3143
MISPREDICTED_BRANCH_RETIRED 0.0872
CYCLE_ACTIVITY:CYCLES_L2_PENDING -0.0234
CYCLE_ACTIVITY:STALLS_LDM_PENDING 0.9819
CYCLE_ACTIVITY:CYCLES_NO_EXECUTE 0.2317
RESOURCE_STALLS:ROB 0
RESOURCE_STALLS:SB -0.0506
RESOURCE_STALLS:RS -0.0044
LD_BLOCKS_PARTIAL:ADDRESS_ALIAS -0.9511
IDQ_UOPS_NOT_DELIVERED -0.1455
IDQ:ALL_DSB_CYCLES_ANY_UOPS 0.0332
ILD_STALL:IQ_FULL 0.1021
ITLB_MISSES:MISS_CAUSES_A_WALK 0
TLB_FLUSH:STLB_THREAD 0
ICACHE:MISSES 0
ICACHE:IFETCH_STALL 0
L1D:REPLACEMENT 0.3801
L2_DEMAND_RQSTS:WB_HIT 0.2436
LONGEST_LAT_CACHE:MISS 0.0633
CYCLE_ACTIVITY:CYCLES_L1D_PENDING -0.0080
LOCK_CYCLES:CACHE_LOCK_DURATION 0
LOAD_HIT_PRE:SW_PF 0
LOAD_HIT_PRE:HW_PF 0
MACHINE_CLEARS:CYCLES 0
OFFCORE_REQUESTS_BUFFER:SQ_FULL 0
OFFCORE_REQUESTS:DEMAND_DATA_RD 0.1765
Table 5: Counters profiled for correlation test
10.2 Row conflict Side Channel
The row conflict side channel retrieves the timing information
of the CPU while doing direct accesses (using clflush) from
the DRAM. A higher timing indicates that the two addresses
are mapped to the same bank in the DRAM because reading
an address from the same bank forces the row buffer to copy
the previous contents back to the original row and then load
the newly accessed data into the row buffer. Whereas, a low
timings indicates that two addresses are not in the same bank
(not sharing the same row buffer) and are loaded into separate
row buffers. Figure 15 shows a wide gap (around 100 cycles)
between row hits and row conflicts.
Figure 15: Timings for accessing the aliased virtual addresses
(random addresses where 20 LSB of the physical address
match). Row hits (orange/low timings) are clearly distinguish-
able from row conflicts (blue/high timings).
10.3 Memory Utilization and Contiguity
The probability of obtaining contiguous memory depends on
memory utilization of the system. We conduct an experiment
to examine the effect of memory utilization on availability
of contiguous memory. In this experiment, 1 GB memory
is allocated. During the experiment, the memory utilization
of the system is increased gradually from 20% to 90%. We
measure the probability of getting the contiguous memory
with two methods. The first one is checking the physical frame
numbers from pagemap file to look for 520 kB of contiguous
memory. The second method is using SPOILER to find the 520
kB of contiguous memory. This 520 kB is required to get three
consecutive rows within a bank for a DRAM configuration
having 256 kB row offset and 8 kB row size.
Figure 16 and Figure 17 show that when the memory has
been fragmented after intense memory usage, it gets more
difficult to allocate a contiguous chunk of memory. Even de-
creasing the memory usage does not help to get a contiguous
block of memory. Figure 17 depicts that after the memory
utilization has been decreased from 70% to 60% and so on,
there is not enough contiguous memory to mount a success-
ful double-sided Rowhammer attack. Until the machine is
restarted, the memory remains fragmented which makes a
double-sided Rowhammer attack difficult, especially on tar-
gets like high-end servers where restarting is impractical.
The observed behavior can be explained by the binary
buddy allocator which is responsible for the physical address
allocation in the Linux OS [15]. This type of allocator is
known to fragment memory significantly under certain cir-
cumstances [37]. The Linux OS uses a SLAB/SLOB allocator
in order to circumvent the fragmentation problems. How-
ever, the allocator only serves the kernel directly. User space
memory therefore still suffers from the fragmentation that the
buddy allocator introduces. This also means that getting the
contiguous memory required for a double-sided Rowhammer
attack becomes more difficult if the system under attack has
been active for a while.
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Figure 16: Finding contiguous memory of 520 kB with in-
creasing memory utilization. The overlap between the red
and blue plot indicates the high accuracy of the contiguous
memory detection capability of SPOILER as verified by the
pagemap file.
2030405060708090
System Memory Consumption (%)
0
5
10
15
20
25
Co
nt
ig
uo
us
 M
em
or
y 
(%
) 520KB Contiguous Memory from pagemap File
520KB Contiguous Memory from Leakage Peaks
Figure 17: Finding contiguous memory of 520 kB with de-
creasing memory utilization.
